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THE STARS ALIGNED: THE LEGALITY,
LEGITIMACY, AND LEGACY OF 2011’S
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
Rachel E. VanLandingham*
Certainly it is undoubted that ever since civil societies were
formed, the rulers of each claimed some especial right over his
own subjects. . . . [But] [i]f a tyrant . . . practises [sic]
atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can
approve, the right of human social conne[ct]ion is not cut off
in such a case.1
I. INTRODUCTION: LIBYAN INTERVENTION REINFORCES UNITED NATIONS
PARADIGM AND RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE
The United Nations Security Council’s passage of the United Nations
Security Council Resolution (“UNSCR”) 1973 in March 2011, authorizing
military force in Libya on humanitarian grounds, strengthened the
United Nations Security Council’s role as the legal and legitimate
authorizer of the use of force for such protective purposes.2 It will likely
Judge Advocate, United States Air Force. Presently assigned as a deputy department
head and assistant professor in the Department of Law at the United States Air Force
Academy; LL.M. 2006, Military Law, The Judge Advocate General’s School, Charlottesville,
Virginia; J.D. 2000, The University of Texas at Austin; M.P.M. (Masters of Public
Management) 1994, University of Maryland; B.S. (Political Science), 1992, United States Air
Force Academy. Member of the Bars of Texas, U.S.A.F. Court of Criminal Appeals, Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and the Supreme Court of the United States. The views
expressed herein are those of the individual Author only, and do not purport to express the
views of the Department of the Air Force or any other department or agency of the United
States government. I would like to thank Nicole Cudiamat and Melissa Croom for their
valuable research assistance on earlier drafts of this Essay.
1
WILLIAM WHEWELL, HUGONIS GROTII DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS LIBRI TRES 439–40
(translating the words of Hugo Grotius). Grotius believed that states have a discretionary
right to intervene, by force if necessary, in another state to prevent grave human suffering
but do not have an obligation to do so. Id. This Essay argues that the current trend among
nations is moving toward acceptance of an actual obligation to do so. See J.L. Holzgrefe,
The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL,
AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 15, 26-27 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane, eds., 2003)
(articulating a tenet of natural law theory that views humanitarian intervention as a
discretionary right versus moral obligation).
2
S.C. Res. 1973, ¶¶ 4, 6–8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing the use
of military force in Libya in light of the humanitarian rights abuses being committed).
Resolution 1973, issued on March 17, 2011, supplements Resolution 1970, issued on
February 26, 2011. Id. Resolution 1970 referred the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court and called for an arms embargo and asset freeze against
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for continuing human rights violations, as well as instituted a
travel ban against certain persons connected to the Libyan government and considered
*
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also make future unilateral (i.e., without Security Council authorization)
military action on such grounds more difficult to justify and perhaps
even less likely to actually occur, if only due to UNSCR 1973’s
precedential value, and will make the normative status of such unilateral
intervention less uncertain than it has been in the past. The passage of
UNSCR 1973 reinforced the extant legal paradigm of non-intervention
unless in self-defense or authorized by the Security Council, and
buttressed the evolving international norm that grievous human rights
abuses occurring solely within one state constitute a threat to
international peace and security.3 Furthermore, it strengthened the
concept of a collective international responsibility to act when a state
fails to protect its population from grievous human rights abuses and
reinforced a legal realist approach to such situations, though such
collective responsibility has far to go before reaching peremptory norm
status. Critically, the capability to intervene at relatively minimal cost,
especially in terms of exposure of U.S. troops to danger, played a large
role in the lack of U.S. domestic public opposition to the intervention;
this allowed the Obama administration to support the United Nations
(“UN”) resolution and thus contribute to the above norm. While the
tension between state sovereignty plus peaceful relations among states
and the protection of human rights has certainly not been resolved, the
recent Libyan military intervention underscores the willingness of the
international community to pursue UN-sanctioned action on grounds of
protecting civilian populations, but only when all the stars align via a
UN-sanctioned constellation.
The UN Security Council’s March 2011 resolution, which allowed for
all necessary means to protect civilians, does, at least facially, implement
and reinforce the so-called “[r]esponsibility to protect” doctrine

responsible for some of those violations. See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 4, 9–10, 15, 17, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). Resolution 1973 determined that the situation in Libya
constituted a threat to international peace and security; demanded a cease-fire and end of
violence against civilians; called for: a no-fly zone over Libya, stronger enforcement of the
arms embargo, a travel ban on additional individuals, and a complete flight ban in and out
of Libya. S.C. Res. 1973, supra, ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 13, 17, 19. It also authorized “all necessary
measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.” Id. ¶
4.
3
See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 2, ¶¶ 1, 7–8 (demonstrating the use of intervention in a
non-international armed conflict by demanding a cease fire and establishing a no-fly zone
in Libya, with the exception of humanitarian aid planes, and authorizing U.N. member
states to enforce the no-fly zone); Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?
The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 31, 33–34
(2005) (concluding that such an international norm—that human rights abuses within one
state constitute a threat to international peace and security—already exists).
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endorsed by the international community in 2005.4 This principle,
articulated by the international community in non-binding documents,
recognizes an international—versus solely sovereign state—
responsibility to act in specific situations. It provides that, “[e]ach
individual [s]tate has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”
and that the UN is “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and
decisive manner, through the Security Council . . . on a case-by-case
basis . . . should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”5
However, Security Council Resolution 1973 may not be unanimously
viewed as a ringing vindication of the responsibility to protect doctrine
because it was not driven solely by humanitarian motives to prevent
crimes against humanity (though the expenditure of resources for
collective military action rarely has been justified purely on
humanitarian grounds, given the costs and complex societal processes
necessary to gain support for such action, especially in democracies).
While the grave potential for greater civilian slaughter was surely a
major impetus behind UNSCR 1973 (the resolution itself states that the
Libyan government’s actions may amount to crimes against humanity),
the geopolitical tides of the Arab Spring played an even larger role in its
passage.6 The need for a “powerful demonstration effect” to help other
beleaguered citizens across the Arab world throw off dictatorial shackles
cannot be discounted as a primary driving force of UNSCR 1973, at least
by major western powers.7 Furthermore, the lack of love the Libyan
leader engendered in his fellow regional leaders—as well as around the
globe—surely helped the UNSCR’s passage, and helped solidify the rare
support of such intervention by the Arab street.8
Despite these non-humanitarian geopolitical dynamics, the 2011 UNauthorized military intervention in Libya underscores a growing
international consensus that a domestic humanitarian crisis can
See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/L.1 ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/L.1
(Sept. 15, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome] (articulating the responsibility
to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity).
5
Id. ¶¶ 138–39.
6
S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 2.
7
Shadi Hamid, Lessons of the Libya Intervention, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 22, 2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/lessons-of-the-libyaintervention/243922/.
8
Stewart Patrick, Libya and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, FOREIGN AFF. (Aug.
26, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68233/stewart-patrick/libya-and-thefuture-of-humanitarian-intervention.
4
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constitute a threat to international peace and security. At the time of the
resolution, fellow Arab states emphasized that “Libya was suffering
heavily, with hundreds of victims dying and thousands displaced.”9
Prior to the Security Council’s vote, the Arab League called for the UN to
authorize a “no-fly zone” over Libya to create “safe zones” as a
“humanitarian measure to protect Libyan civilians.”10 Even non-major
world powers outside the Arab street concurred with the need for action.
Colombia’s UN ambassador stated that:
[H]is delegation was convinced that the purpose of the
new resolution was essentially humanitarian and was
conducive to bringing about conditions that would lead
to the protection of civilians under attack from a regime
that had lost all legitimacy. The Council had acted
because the Government, through its actions, had shown
that it was not up to protecting and promoting the rights
of its people.11
At the time, President Obama stressed that Libya faced “brutal
repression and a looming humanitarian crisis,” while also
acknowledging the confluence of factors, which made intervention
appropriate, such as “an international mandate for action, a broad
coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea
for help from the Libyan people themselves. We also had the ability to
stop Qaddafi’s forces in their tracks without putting American troops on
the ground.”12 These humanitarian justifications supported calls for
action specifically under the Security Council’s authority to act to
remedy or prevent breaches to international peace and security. World
leaders also cited the geographical importance of Libya and the potential
transnational strategic effects of a mass refugee exodus from Libya
stemming from the humanitarian crisis—but their primary stated
justification for military intervention focused squarely on the Libyan

U.N. Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya, Authorizing
‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Absentions, U.N.
Doc. SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Council Approves ‘No-Fly’ Zone].
10
Arab League Asks U.N. to Impose a No-fly Zone Over Libya to Protect Civilians from Air
Attack, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 13, 2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-0313/news/29139723_1_arab-league-zone-league-statement.
11
Council Approves ‘No-Fly’ Zone, supra note 9.
12
President Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, President
Obama’s Speech on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
photos-and-video/video/2011/03/28/president-obama-s-speech-libya#transcript
[hereinafter Obama’s Speech on Libya].
9
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government’s alleged past and potential future crimes against humanity
within its sovereign borders.
These humanitarian justifications employed the concepts inherent in
the responsibility to protect doctrine, as well as its language. In his
speech to the American people a few weeks after the Security Council’s
vote, President Obama stated that “[t]o brush aside America’s
responsibility as a leader and—more profoundly—our responsibilities to
our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a
betrayal of who we are.”13 This sentiment underscores the point made
Id.; see Dominic Evans, Gaddafi Wins Little Arab Sympathy as West Strikes, REUTERS (Mar.
19, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/19/us-libya-arabs-reaction-idUSTRE7
2I42T20110319 (discussing Arab street’s reaction to UNSCR 1973; highlighting Lebanon’s
Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s comment). “Today, unfortunately, as a result
of most Arab and Muslim leaders abandoning their responsibilities, the door has been
opened to foreign intervention in Libya and we do not know where matters are heading.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Nasrallah’s emphasis on the Arab world’s
“responsibilities” demonstrates the conceptual shift from “rights” to “responsibilities” by
nations regarding events previously considered in the domestic realm. Id. Other world
leaders echoed this sentiment. See Maria Golovina & Michael Georgy, Western Warplanes,
Missiles Hit Libyan Targets, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/03/19/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20110319 (quoting British Prime Minister David
Cameron as saying “‘We cannot allow the slaughter of civilians to continue.’”); Nissa Rhee,
Nations Weigh Imposing No-fly Zone On Libya, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/0303/Nations-weighimposing-no-fly-zone-on-Libya (quoting Amr Moussa, the Arab League’s SecretaryGeneral as saying “The situation in Libya is sorrowful and it is not correct that we accept it
or live with it, . . . . The Arab League will not stand with its hands tied while the blood of
the brotherly Libyan people is spilt.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Arab League to
Officially Request UN Impose No-fly Zone on Libya, HAARETZ.COM (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/arab-league-to-officially-request-unimpose-no-fly-zone-on-libya-1.348747 (quoting Amr Moussa, Secretary-General of the Arab
League as saying “The Arab League decided on Saturday that the ‘serious crimes and great
violations’ the Libyan government had committed against its people had stripped it of
legitimacy.”); Arab States Seek Libya No-fly Zone, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 12, 2011),
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/03/201131218852687848.html (highlighting
that despite opposition to the actual UNSCR authorizing intervention in Libya, the African
Union still cited a need for outside intervention in Libya—just by other African states, and
not via Western powers: “‘urgent African action’” is needed to end the Libyan
government’s action against its population, stated Ramtane Lamamra, head of the African
Union’s Peace and Security Council). Not all world leaders shared this sentiment,
however. See Venezuela’s Chavez Blasts Intervention in Libya, LATIN AMERICANIST BLOG (Mar.
30,
2011),
http://ourlatinamerica.blogspot.com/2011/03/venezuelas-chavez-blastsintervention.html (quoting Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez as saying “‘We don’t want
outside strange elements in the region that come to alter the peace we need.’”); Vishnu
Prakash, Use of Force is Not Acceptable to India; Not in Libya, Not Anywhere Else, DECCAN
CHRONICLE (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.deccanchronicle.com/360-degree/%E2%80%
98use-force-not-acceptable-india-not-libya-not-anywhere-else%E2%80%99-903 (discussing
statements by India’s spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs, regarding why India
did not support UNSCR 1973). “We have always gone by the premise that use of force is
13
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above: that the responsibility to protect doctrine, infused in the lexicon
of national leaders, gained significant traction as an evolving norm in
international law via the Libyan intervention, albeit not in a vacuum.
The resolution was largely based on the desire to prevent further civilian
casualties by the Libyan government, and such preventative action was
taken by and through the UN Security Council, in step with the 2005
General Assembly’s articulation of this doctrine. President Obama’s
choice of words are especially interesting when coupled with the
pronouncements made at the same time by his senior policy staff, such
as those by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, that Libya did not
involve vital U.S. interests.14 Hence, the U.S. support of the Libyan
intervention, despite an alleged lack of vital national interests, seems in
step with the responsibility to protect norm’s emphasis on collective
international action to protect human rights when they are gravely
threatened, despite the lack of other national or international factors.
Interestingly, only five months later, after the United States supported
UNSCR 1973, President Obama unveiled his “Presidential Study
Directive on Mass Atrocities,” which “define[d] the prevention of mass
atrocities as both ‘a core national security interest and a core moral
responsibility of the United States.’”15
This document signals a shift toward the acceptance, at least by the
United States, of a duty or moral obligation to intervene in such
situations, versus the previously-prevailing concept of a “right” to
intervene without any such moral duty or legal compulsion to do so.16
Whether this potential acceptance is a step toward developing a legally
binding international norm via shared opinio juris and state practice
remains to be seen.17 What can be surmised today is that this automatic
linkage, by one of the world’s leading powers, of the prevention of mass
atrocities to its core national interests propels such prevention up the
ladder of required state and international community action, in better

unacceptable . . . [despite being] deeply concerned about the welfare of the people of
Libya . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
14
Jon Hilsenrath, Gates Says Libya Not Vital US National Interest, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704308904576226704261420430.
html.
15
Patrick, supra note 8.
16
See Holzgrefe, supra note 1, at 26–27 (articulating a tenet of natural law theory that
views humanitarian intervention as a discretionary right versus moral obligation).
17
See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (listing sources of
international law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 102, 103 (2011) (outlining constituent elements of customary international law).
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alignment with the responsibility to protect doctrine.18 If prevention
truly is a core national interest, and those interests are ones which a state,
presumably, will use force to achieve if necessary, then most legal
realists will agree that by equating the prevention of mass human
suffering in another nation to one’s own core national interests moves
humanitarian intervention closer to being “required,” at least
pragmatically, if not morally.19
So what relevance does an Essay on the 2011 Libyan humanitarian
intervention have to this special edition Law Review, itself focused on jus
in bello issues associated with the treatment of civilians who are directly
participating in hostilities? U.S. support of UNSCR 1973 actually
highlights an interesting intersection of jus ad bellum and jus in bello that
bears consideration—President Obama’s March speech justifying the
Libyan intervention is telling in this regard: “We also had the ability to
stop Qaddafi’s forces in their tracks without putting American troops on
the ground.”20 What was the linchpin of this stand-off capability that
allowed the United States to participate without risking ground troops?
Drones. The United States’ use of remotely-piloted vehicles such as
Predators constituted “a resumption of a direct combat role for U.S.
aircraft in Libya” when the manned North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(“NATO”) aircraft were having difficulty locating the small groups of
Libyan government forces who were using small weapons, such as
mortars to target civilians and rebels.21 The Predator’s loiter ability—its
ability to remain far above a specific location for hours at a time, with no
risk to pilots, and collect vast amounts of extremely accurate
intelligence—allows its operators to marry that real-time intelligence
with the vehicle’s firepower, that is, to employ its Hellfire missiles
against those Libyan units, which only surface for a brief period of time
to launch their mortar attacks.22 This emerging capability to use drones
to achieve strategic objectives with greater precision than achieved in
any previous “no-fly zone,” without risking lives of pilots, may make
18
See Holzgrefe, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing how theorists such as Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
who define national interests broadly, view certain humanitarian interventions as morally
obligatory).
19
See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Why the Gulf War Served the National Interest, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1991, at 64 (discussing what constitutes national interests).
20
Obama’s Speech on Libya, supra note 12.
21
Dan Cloud, U.S. Begins Using Predator Drones in Libya, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/22/world/la-fg-gates-libya-20110422.
22
See U.S. Introduces Armed Predator Drones in Libya, ENGLISH.NEWS.CN (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-04/22/c_13840190.htm (describing
the unique capabilities of the drones deployed in Libya, including their ability to provide
better vision of the ground and fly much longer periods of time than manned conventional
planes).
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policy makers increasingly inclined to intervene in such complex
humanitarian interventions, since their nation’s risks and costs are
substantially lower than at any other time in history.
Imagine if President Clinton had had drones at his disposal when
the UN sought U.S. support and assistance to prevent a looming
genocide in Rwanda that fateful week in 1994. As this Essay later
discusses, President Clinton (and the majority of western powers) was
hamstrung from supporting a UN intervention in Rwanda by the 1992
debacle in Somalia during which a small number of U.S. service
members died. But if General Dallaire had come to the United States
with a list of a few individuals whose “targeted killing” would prevent
the looming slaughter of civilians, the deaths of hundreds of thousands
of innocent Rwandans may have been prevented via the use of remotelypiloted vehicles.23 The successful use of remotely-piloted vehicles in the
UN-authorized Libyan intervention may embolden policy makers to use
them with greater frequency, thus involving the United States in more
use of force situations, which previously had been deemed too difficult
for involvement. The minimal exposure of U.S. service members to
danger, made possible via use of weapon systems such as drones and
Tomahawk missiles in the Libyan intervention, was a major component
of the Obama administration’s conclusion that U.S. participation (at least
by mid-June 2011) did not constitute “hostilities” under domestic
legislation regarding separation of powers issues; this allowed the
administration to continue such “non-hostilities” without congressional
authorization.24
This “non-hostilities” rationale underscores the above point: that
current capabilities may make interventions such as the one in Libya
easier for policy makers to engage in, both technologically and politically
(at least domestically regarding the latter). If such use of remotelypiloted vehicles emboldens policymakers to act in the name of the
international community’s responsibility to protect, then there needs to
be greater clarity regarding the targeting process and how and when
See generally UN General’s Rwandan Nightmares, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2000),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/820827.stm (discussing General Dallairs’s role in the
UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda and his “inability to prevent the mass killings of
more than 800,000 Rwandans”).
24
See Robert M. Chesney, A Primer on the Libya/War Powers Resolution Compliance Debate,
BROOKINGS (June 17, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0617_war_powers
_chesney.aspx?p=1 (discussing the Obama administration’s conclusion that U.S.
participation in the Libyan no-fly zone no longer constituted hostilities as intended under
the War Powers Resolution); see also Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Sept. 2001, at 86 (discussing the varied reasons the Clinton administration failed
to intervene in Rwanda, including the “highly circumscribed understanding of what was
‘possible’ for the United States to do”).
23
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civilians become targets, especially if the United States does not believe
these targeting actions amount to hostilities. If such actions do not
constitute hostilities, then what governing body of law applies? Also,
will these weapon systems likewise make future action, which is not
approved by the Security Council, more likely? While other articles and
essays in this law review implicate the first question, this Essay
addresses the second, and concludes that humanitarian intervention
outside of the UN regime is less likely following the Libyan intervention,
regardless of relative technological ease, because of the evolving
fortification of the UN Charter’s (“the Charter”) paradigm for use of
force.
In summary, the following discussion clarifies how UNSCR 1973,
which authorized the use of military force for the protection of Libyan
citizens, is consistent with the Charter despite the absence of an explicit
provision allowing for the use of force based on protecting human rights.
Since the Charter allows the Security Council to approve the use of force
to maintain or restore international peace and security, if the Security
Council considers a situation as impacting international peace and
authority, then it has the authority to act. This pigeon-holing of
humanitarian intervention into an “international peace and security”
rubric is not new, as later discussed in this Essay. Additionally, the
Libyan intervention strengthens the expansion of this basis for Security
Council action. This Essay also explores the historical context, which
leads this Author to conclude that UNSCR 1973 weakened the legal
status of humanitarian intervention without Security Council
authorization, concomitantly strengthened the Security Council’s role in
approving such action, and reinforced the responsibility to protect
doctrine.
II. LEGALITY OF UNSCR 1973
Because both a sanction regime and military action in Libya were
authorized by the Security Council instead of unilaterally conducted by
one or more nations, the Libyan intervention strengthened the UN’s
Westphalian system of collective security, which revolves around the
sanctity of the state and constituent states’ acknowledgment of the
Charter’s supremacy.25 Furthermore, the UN’s action in Libya restores
some credibility to the United States and Great Britain whose credibility
“as norm carriers” was weakened by the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the
25
Contra Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 130, 138–40 (discussing a different
perspective regarding the UN system’s legitimacy).
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subsequent protracted Iraq war.26 Both were key actors in building
consensus in support of UNSCR 1973; perhaps success in Libya will
make it easier for these and other states to persuade others to act
decisively in “humanitarian emergencies,” despite earlier forecasts to the
contrary.27
Finally, and most critically for this Essay’s purposes, UNSCR 1973
notably weakened the legal status of humanitarian intervention without
Security Council authorization—a course of action many had argued was
legally ambiguous, or even legally appropriate, following the NATO’s
non-Security Council sanctioned intervention in Kosovo in 1999.28 Great
Britain argued at the time that use of force could be justified in Kosovo
without explicit Security Council authorization “‘on the grounds of
overwhelming humanitarian necessity.’”29 Tony Blair, Britain’s Prime
Minister at the time, expanded upon this theory in his 1999 speech in
Chicago where he outlined five primary criteria to use when deciding
whether intervention is warranted; he implied that Security Council
authorization, while preferred, is not required.30 Belgium went even
further in arguing that NATO’s unilateral military intervention in
Kosovo was lawful because it was necessary to protect a jus cogens, and
was consistent with both earlier Security Council resolutions and with
Article 2(4).31 These positions highlight the point that many legal
theorists and policymakers understood the unilateral NATO use of force
on humanitarian grounds in Kosovo in 1999 as having “established the
norm of resort to force without the authorisation [sic] of the UN Security
Council.”32 This Essay explores the historical context, which led to that
Bellamy, supra note 3, at 32.
Id. at 33.
28
See Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 232, 239–40 (discussing the controversy behind the use of
the Blair Doctrine in the Kosovo intervention).
29
Id. at 236.
30
Chris Abbott & John Sloboda, The ‘Blair Doctrine’ and After: Five Years of Humanitarian
Intervention, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Apr. 21, 2004), http://www.opendemocracy.net/print/
1857; see Chris Abbott, Rights and Responsibilities: Resolving the Dilemma of Humanitarian
Intervention, J. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, Sept. 2005, at 1, 4, available at
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a180.pdf (elucidating Blair criteria and effects of
Blair proposal) [hereinafter Abbott, Rights and Responsibilities]; see also Stromseth, supra note
28, at 240. Prime Minister Blair did not ignore the UN system altogether, however; he
linked support of the NATO military intervention in Kosovo to earlier Security Council
Resolutions, stressing the consistency of purpose between the two. Id.
31
Stromseth, supra note 28, at 239; see also Provisional Measures, Legality of Use of Force
(Serb. & Montenegro v. Belgium), ¶ II (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/105/4515.pdf (outlining Belgium’s arguments).
32
Abbott & Sloboda, supra note 30; see Bellamy, supra note 3, at 34 (discussing how the
Kosovar intervention was viewed as “a watershed’’ regarding acceptance of non-UN
26
27
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argument, and how the recent Libyan intervention once again shifted the
dialogue and impacted the legality and legitimacy of such action.
A. Background: Humanitarian Intervention and the Charter
Humanitarian intervention refers to the non-consensual use or threat
of use of military force against a state for the purpose of protecting
people within that state—that is, to prevent or stop grave human rights
abuses from being perpetrated within that state.33 This is neither a new
concept, nor a new guise for the use of force for other reasons.34 The use
of force for purely humanitarian reasons, and not simply as a cover for
self-interested invasion, was promoted by the great naturalist Hugo
Grotius, and some argue that humanitarian intervention constituted
customary international law prior to passage of the Charter—there
certainly was state practice to support such a stance.35
However, the debatable customary law status of humanitarian
intervention prior to the close of World War II was clarified by passage
of the Charter in 1945, which established a new legal paradigm for the
use of force.36 The Charter closed the door on non-UN approved use of
force except in cases of self-defense. In fact, when the Charter was being
debated, the French advocated for an amendment that would have
explicitly allowed humanitarian intervention without Security Council
authorization.37 It was defeated out of sovereignty fears, and the debate
authorized humanitarian intervention, and that it represented a general agreement that
states have a “right” to intervene on such humanitarian grounds).
33
See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT 8 (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf
[hereinafter ICISS] (outlining generally accepted contours of what defines humanitarian
intervention); see also Buchanan, supra note 25, at 130 (defining humanitarian intervention).
34
See T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust
Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 4–9 (2002) (discussing history of humanitarian
intervention).
35
Id. at 12.
36
See generally U.N. Charter (establishing the creation of the UN); infra Part II.B
(discussing the UN schema of international humanitarian law protections).
37
See Stephen Carley, Limping Toward Elysium: Impediments Created by the Myth of
Westphalia on Humanitarian Intervention in the International Legal System, 41 CONN. L. REV.
1741, 1770 (2009) (discussing the proposed 1945 amendment). “[T]he enforcement powers
chapter to allow UN intervention in cases where ‘the clear violation of essential liberties
and of human rights constitute[d] in itself a threat capable of compromising peace.’” Id.
The French representative stated that the amendment “was in recognition of the historical
experience of Nazism and the Holocaust, which had illustrated the desirability of
international intervention for the purpose of protecting ‘certain unfortunate minorities.’”
Id. The French amendment was supported by China, but several countries, including
Australia (which proposed the initial counter-amendment that would become the
“domestic jurisdiction clause” of Article 2(7)), the United States, and the United Kingdom,
opposed the French provision that would essentially give the UN the power to involve
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surrounding it demonstrated the tension between what was then seen
largely as a purely internal, domestic issue within the exclusive domain
of the sovereign state, and an awareness that human rights should be
respected and promoted by the international community. This Essay
clarifies how UNSCR 1973, which authorized the use of military force for
the protection of Libyan citizens, is consistent with the Charter despite
the absence of an explicit provision allowing for the use of force based on
protecting human rights. Since the Charter allows the Security Council
to approve the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and
security, if the Security Council considers a situation as impacting
international peace and authority, then it has the authority to act.
B. UN Schema
The fundamental premise of the Charter is the prohibition of the use
of force by its members except in self-defense or when authorized by the
Security Council—and then only in cases to prevent aggression or
restore/maintain international peace and security.38 Article 2(4) of the
Charter states that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the [UN].”39 In Chapter VII, the Charter gives the
Security Council alone the authority to determine threats to international
peace and security, breaches of that peace, or acts of aggression, and
provides that the Security Council should decide what measures to take
to maintain or restore international peace and security.40 Chapter VII,
Article 42 stipulates that the Security Council “may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade[s], and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the [UN].”41 Chapter VII, Article 53 further
specifies that regional organizations (for example, NATO) must first
obtain Security Council authorization before engaging in “enforcement
themselves in purely domestic affairs of member states. Id. Even in 1945, Article 2(7) as it
was adopted was considered “‘potentially the most substantial limitation that is to be
found anywhere in the whole Charter upon the activity of the [UN].’” Id. at 1772 (citations
omitted).
38
U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
[UN], until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.”).
39
Id. at art. 2, ¶ 4.
40
Id. at arts. 39, 41–42.
41
Id. at art. 42.
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action” (that is, the use of force for maintaining or restoring international
peace and security).42
In other words, the Charter, whose primary purpose is to maintain
international peace and security, gives the Security Council a monopoly
on enforcement measures against aggression and breaches of
international peace and security.43 The Charter places a premium on

42
Id. at art 53, ¶ 1; see Richard N. Gardner, A Life in International Law and Diplomacy, 44
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 7 (2005) (discussing the 1962 United States naval quarantine of
Cuba and the explanation of the United States before the UN for why the quarantine was
not a blockade, and therefore an act of war); Suyash Paliwal, The Primacy of Regional
Organization in International Peacekeeping: The African Example, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 185, 193–94
(2010) (recognizing a contrast between “[t]he weight of scholarly opinion . . . that
‘enforcement action’ [under Article 2(4)] includes all . . . uses of force by regional
organizations” including peacekeeping measures, but that “peacekeeping operations by
regional organizations in accordance with a constitutive treaty framework against one of
the organization’s members do not constitute ‘enforcement actions’ within the meaning of
Article 53” (citations omitted)). The United States cited Article 53 of the UN Charter and
argued that although regional organizations cannot take enforcement action without
Security Council approval, “because the quarantine had a very limited purpose and was
authorized, not commanded, by the [Organization of American States],” it was not
technically an enforcement action. Id.; see also Ugo Villani, The Security Council’s
Authorization of Enforcement Action by Regional Organizations, 6 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. L. 535,
538–39 (2002) (discussing whether regional organization enforcement measures requiring
Security Council approval “consist of enforcement measures of any type, or whether such
authorization is only necessary for . . . cases involving the use of armed force (or . . . the
threat of such force)” and concluding that “the enforcement measures which are
subordinate to the Security Council’s authorization are only those involving the use (or the
threat) of armed force” because “enforcement measures . . . of a commercial, diplomatic or
financial nature, are not forbidden by the Charter”). As the Charter only explicitly
prohibits the use of armed force as a tool of international relations in Article 2(4), other
enforcement measures used as tools of international relations do not require authorization.
Id.
43
Contra Paliwal, supra note 42, at 194 (“[A]pproval or commendation of a regional
enforcement action after it has taken place satisfies the authorization requirement of Article
53(1), often pointing to the Security Council’s treatment of [the Economic Community Of
West African States’] 1990 intervention in Liberia.” (citations omitted)). Although
ECOWAS intervened in Liberia without first obtaining Security Council authorization
under Article 53(1), the Security Council later “‘[c]ommend[ed] ECOWAS for its efforts to
restore peace, security and stability to the conflict in Liberia’” resulting in an interpretation
that the Security Council’s post hoc commendation constituted appropriate “authorization
for a regional enforcement action.” Id. at 195 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Thus, there is some precedent for occurrences of enforcement actions constituting technical
Article 53 violations being approved by the Security Council after the action has already
occurred. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 788, ¶¶ 1–2, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (Nov. 19, 1992)
(“Commend[ing] ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace, security and stability in
Liberia; . . . call[ing] upon ECOWAS to continue its efforts to assist in the peaceful
implementation of [the Yamoussoukro IV] Accord; . . . [and] [c]ondemn[ing] the continuing
armed attacks against the peace-keeping forces of ECOWAS in Liberia by one of the parties
to the conflict.”).
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state sovereignty and peaceful relations among states.44 It reinforces “an
international state order dependent on the sovereignty of states and the
inviolability of their territory.”45 Article 2(4)’s prohibition against the use
of force is complemented by Article 2(7)’s policy of non-intervention by
the UN in states’ domestic affairs—except when authorized by the
Security Council via its Chapter VII powers. Article 2(7) stipulates that:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.46
While Article 2(7) has been used to oppose actions taken solely on
humanitarian grounds—including those not sanctioned by the UN,
exemplified by India’s protests against the NATO bombing of Kosovo in
1999—it is generally agreed that Article 2(7) only limits action by the
UN, whereas Article 2(4) limits states.47 Per its text, Article 2(7) does not
apply to UN enforcement measures, which include all binding decisions
made by the Security Council under Chapter VII.48 But it nonetheless
has been used generally to oppose both unilateral, non-UN approved
intervention on humanitarian grounds, as well as to oppose Security
Council authorization for the same.49
The Charter’s collective security paradigm, an attempt to banish
World War II and its ilk to the historical dustbin, includes a stated carveout to the prohibition against force via the customary international law
concept of self-defense.50 It allows states to use force in self-defense if
attacked, but not for any other reason (such as to stop a state from

Buchanan, supra note 25, at 131.
See ICISS, supra note 33, at VII (raising the issue of the policy conflict between
preserving state sovereignty and the necessity of humanitarian intervention in the
sovereign territory of a state).
46
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
47
Kawser Ahmed, The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the United Nations Charter: A
Historical View, 10 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 175, 184 (2006).
48
Id. at 186.
49
See Council Approves ‘No-Fly’ Zone, supra note 9. China, when explaining its vote of
abstention regarding UNSCR 1973, made reference to the fact that the “Charter must be
respected,” implying that perhaps Article 2(7) was being violated by the resolution in some
manner. Id.
50
PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 27
(7th rev. ed. 1999).
44
45
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perpetrating gross human rights violations within its own borders).51 In
addition to the Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, it also promotes
and maintains state sovereignty through the Security Council itself:
Only the Security Council can authorize, by an affirmative vote of nine
members, the use of force against a member state by other member
state(s), and the five permanent members of the Security Council hold
veto power.52 In other words, of the fifteen Security Council members,
all five permanent members (United States, United Kingdom, France,
China, and Russia) must either authorize the proposed action or abstain
from voting.53 This voting procedure has historically posed a high
hurdle for those seeking authorization to use force—especially true for
the majority of the Security Council’s existence, shadowed as it was for
almost fifty years by the Cold War.54 But it can also be viewed as an
important check on the UN’s power, thus ensuring that any collective
action has the imprimatur of the five permanent members as well as
most others.55
Not only did the permanent party veto power stymie much Security
Council action, it frequently neutered the entire UN collective security
regime during much of the Cold War. The former Soviet Union
exercised its veto power 114 times between 1945 and 1992, and the
Such
United States sixty-nine times during that same period.56
Compare U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the [UN].”), with id. ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the [UN] to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter . . . .”).
52
U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶¶ 1–2.
53
See id. (outlining the voting procedure for Security Council decisions).
54
Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 6
(2006). The Cold War period was marked by decades of Security Council deadlock due to
the permanent members exercising their veto power:
After the Korean War—when UN intervention was made possible only
because the Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council vote in
connection with another issue—the Security Council was never able to
authorize the use of force to counter Cold War-era military aggression.
If the aggression served Soviet interests, the USSR would veto any
proposed resolution; if the aggression served American interests, the
[United States] would veto any proposed resolution.
Id.
55
See generally Niels Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the
UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by ‘Coalitions of the Willing’, 11 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 541 (2000) (discussing various perspectives on the role of the Security Council).
56
Global Policy Forum, Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council,
GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/Tables_and_
Charts/useofveto.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
51
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impotency led to an evolving acknowledgment, within and among
nations, that action taken without Security Council authorization, when
approved by the majority of the General Assembly, could be legitimate.57
The General Assembly passed the “Uniting for Peace” UNGA Resolution
377 in 1950 in an attempt to allow the General Assembly to act in
situations that affected international peace and security but in which the
Security Council was unable to act.58 This resolution called on the
General Assembly to immediately meet and issue non-binding
recommendations, including those recommending the collective use of
armed force, when the Security Council failed to maintain international
peace and security.59 It created “emergency special session[s]” of the
General Assembly,60 and was first utilized during the Suez Crisis in 1956,
in which the United States and USSR teamed together to successfully call
for the withdrawal of Israel, France, and Great Britain from Egypt.61
Emergency sessions have been used to call on South Africa to end its
illegal occupation of Namibia and to deal with UN membership for
Palestine.62
While the Uniting for Peace resolution claimed for the General
Assembly a “subsidiary responsibility with regard to international peace

MALANCZUK, supra note 50, at 392.
See generally Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1775
(Nov. 3, 1950) (giving the General Assembly authority to act to maintain international
peace and security when the Security Council is unable to act).
59
MALANCZUK, supra note 50, at 393; see also Uniting for Peace Resolution, supra note 58,
¶ A(1) (declaring that the United Nations General Assembly can authorize the use of force
for breaches of the peace or acts of aggression if the Security Council fails to act to address
the situation and the failure to act is due to the negative vote of a permanent member.) The
Uniting for Peace Resolution also includes collective measures where there is a “threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Id.
60
Uniting for Peace Resolution, supra note 58, ¶ A(1). The Resolution allows for the
General Assembly to bypass a Security Council stalemate in the event of Security Council
deadlock paired with a necessity to act. Id. The General Assembly may thereafter call an
emergency meeting on the issue in the following manner:
If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in
emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request
therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested
by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a
majority of the Members of the [UN].
Id.
61
MALANCZUK, supra note 50, at 393.
62
See Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace General Assembly Resolution 377(V),
AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L., http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html (last
visited Oct. 4, 2011). To date ten special sessions have been called under the Uniting for
Peace Resolution. Id.; see also Emergency Special Sessions, U.N. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2012)
(providing a list of instances where emergency special sessions have been called).
57
58
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and security” based on Article 14 of the Charter,63 this resolution
continued to recognize the primacy of the Security Council in these
matters.64 Furthermore, it implicitly recognized that the UN was the
means to authorize the use of armed force in the international arena—
that is, it did not acknowledge that Security Council inaction could allow
nations to use armed force without any type of UN authorization
whatsoever. Instead, it simply moved the source of the authorization to
the General Assembly when the Security Council failed to act.65 While
the need for such emergency sessions dramatically declined due both to
the end of the Cold War and because the General Assembly began to
meet more frequently outside of special sessions, the Uniting for Peace
Resolution is noteworthy because it opened the door for many to
question whether Security Council authorization is always required
prior to the use of armed force.66
III. EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The Charter has always included the promotion and encouragement
of respect for human rights, but the Security Council’s approval of
UNSCR 1973 specifically to protect the Libyan civilian population must
be placed in context of the tremendous growth of human rights on the
international stage since the UN’s inception.67 Since the passage of the
Tomuschat, supra note 62.
Uniting for Peace Resolution, supra note 58, at 10 (“Reaffirming the importance of the
exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security . . . .”).
65
See generally id. (stating the General Assembly already had the power to issue nonbinding resolutions, but the Uniting for Peace Resolution strengthened the Assembly’s role
regarding the maintenance of international peace and security).
66
See Tomuschat, supra note 62 (noting the shifting of responsibilities to the General
Assembly and questioning the importance of Security Council authorization).
67
U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶¶ 1–4. The first article in the Charter establishes the purposes of
the UN as:
1. To maintain international peace and security
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to
take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction . . . ; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the
attainment of these common ends.
Id. Article 55 states that the UN shall promote the following economic and social concerns
in order to pursue its goals of international peace, stability, and friendly cooperation:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions
of economic and social progress and development;
63
64
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Charter, there has been tremendous growth in treaty development and
other international attempts to provide substantive protection of human
rights—a movement toward the gradual erosion of the once-ironclad
concept that the relationship between a state and its own nationals is
purely an internal state matter. This development of human rights on
the international level, in tension with the Westphalian international
order of pure state sovereignty and its concept of internal domestic
control, resulted in documents such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1984 Convention
Against Torture, and the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.68 The UN established the Commission on Human
Rights in 1946 and the General Assembly created the post of High
Commissioner for Human Rights in 1993.69 During this same timeframe,
regional organizations developed various human rights protocols such
as the 1953 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms.70 This convention is legally binding on its
signatories, unlike the aspirational Universal Declaration, and establishes
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and
related problems; and international cultural and educational
cooperation; and
c.
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.
U.N. Charter art. 55.
68
See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 1987 (requiring states to both
prevent torture within their borders and to consider whether other states engage in torture
prior to transferring individuals to those states, thus mandating states review what had
been previously considered an internal state matter); International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (highlighting the growing priority the
international community is placing on human rights, including political and civil rights);
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S 278 (codifying the peremptory norm against genocide); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 8, 1948) (establishing specific human rights for global protection, transcending
sovereign state borders).
69
What We Do, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS (Feb. 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhatWeDo.aspx. The
purpose of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is to “speak[] out
objectively in the face of human rights violations worldwide, provide[] a forum for
identifying, highlighting and developing responses to today’s human rights challenges,
and act[] as the principal focal point of human rights research, education, public
information, and advocacy activities in the [UN] system.” Id.
70
See generally Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
EN/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter European Convention] (creating obligations to
protect human rights).
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the European Court of Human Rights to render binding decisions
regarding complaints against state parties.71
A. Enforcement of Human Rights: International Peace and Security
This burgeoning international human rights superstructure did not
bring with it separate global enforcement mechanisms outside of the
Security Council’s exclusive authority to both determine threats to
international peace and security and to authorize military action to deal
with said threats. The growing internationalization of the protection of
human rights within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state, along
with the end of the Cold War Security Council dynamics, led to the
greater use of humanitarian justifications for military interventions into
sovereign states, when either the state itself was committing gross
human rights abuses, failing to do anything to stop such abuses, or
failing to alleviate mass human suffering. Even before the end of the
Cold War, there were several instances of unilateral state intervention,
undertaken at least partially on humanitarian grounds, which positively
contributed to the notion that domestic mass human rights abuses were
matters of concern to the international community.72 However, these
instances also underscored that the international community wanted
such interventions to occur with a UN imprimatur. Security Council
approval (or at least General Assembly support garnered via a Uniting
for Peace process) was desired to act as a check and balance against
ulterior motives by intervening nations, and to allay weaker nations’
fears that they would be unilaterally invaded on human rights grounds.
These Cold War instances include: Tanzania’s armed intervention in
Uganda in 1979 to overthrow Ida Amin; Vietnam’s armed intervention in
Cambodia in 1978 “against Pol Pot’s genocidal regime[;]” and India’s
armed “response to Pakistan’s . . . human rights violations” in East
Pakistan in 1971.73 These cases seemed to indicate a willingness by the
world community to consider that mass human rights abuses
occasionally justify the use of force by another nation—that is, that
humanitarian crises can overcome Article 2(7)’s non-intervention norm
and justify forcible violations of sovereignty. These interventions have
even been cited as representing that the UN will “acquiesce in unilateral
intervention under certain circumstances.”74 However, non-intervention
See id. at art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”).
72
See Buchanan, supra note 25, at 130 (stating that several such interventions had moral
justifications).
73
See id. (discussing the primary motivation for these interventions).
74
Robert O. Keohane, Introduction to HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 1, 6.
71
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in the domestic matters of another state, even for humanitarian
purposes, remained the stated default for decades.75 The sovereignty
fears such unilateral actions prompted in states are seen in the 1970
United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations and its emphasis that
“[n]o [s]tate or group of [s]tates has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of
any other [s]tate.”76
While India defended its 1971 incursion into East Pakistan and
eventual defeat of Pakistani forces on self-defense grounds (citing the
impact of millions of refugees into its country), it also indicated that it
needed to protect the victims of Pakistan’s policies within East
Pakistan.77 During Security Council deliberations on India’s offensive,
the Indian representative said that “we have on this particular occasion
absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and the purest of intentions:
to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering.”78
While a large majority of the UN nations condemned India’s action,
despite the well-documented slaughter being perpetrated by Pakistan,
the Security Council failed to pass a resolution calling for the withdrawal
of Indian troops, and the resultant state of Bangladesh was only
admitted to the UN three years later.79 Thomas Franck and others have
highlighted that most states at the time felt threatened by a powerful
country unilaterally invading a weaker one, and “that one state could sit
in judgment on another’s compliance with human rights and
humanitarian law.”80 But the “extreme necessity” of Pakistan’s crimes
against humanity in East Pakistan seemed to mute formal condemnation
of India’s action.81

75
Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules About Rules? Unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 177, 183.
76
Id. at 183 n.22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77
Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 209, 216.
78
U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1606th mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1606 (Dec. 4, 1971). The
Indian representative continued, “this is the fourth time Pakistan has committed
aggression against India. . . . We reserve our right to take . . . all appropriate and necessary
measures to safeguard our security and defen[s]e against aggression from Pakistan.” Id. at
32; see also INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT: RESEARCH, BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND nn.54–75 and accompanying text (2001),
available at http://web.idrc.ca/openebooks/963-1/#rch4fn54 [hereinafter INT’L COMM’N]
(discussing events leading up to India’s 1971 intervention in East Pakistan after reports of
the persecution and offenses committed against the Hindu population in East Pakistan).
79
Franck, supra note 77, at 217.
80
Id.
81
Id.
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There was similar precedential fear regarding Vietnam’s invasion of
Cambodia, which it justified both on self-defense and humanitarian
grounds.82 Thirteen of the fifteen Security Council members supported a
resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops,
and Portugal typified the response of both western and non-aligned
powers:
Neither do we have any doubts about the appalling
record of violation of the most basic and elementary
human rights in Kampuchea . . . . [Nonetheless], there
are no nor can there be any socio-political considerations
that would justify the invasion of the territory of a
sovereign [s]tate by the forces of another [s]tate . . . . 83
But the very fact that Vietnam felt it useful to employ humanitarian
grounds to justify its actions, and that other nations acknowledged such
rationale, though without validating it, was a step towards recognizing
its notional legitimacy.
Both India’s and Vietnam’s violations of Article 2(4) were seen by the
world as motivated by the self-interest of the invading countries—
invading nations with unclean hands who stood to greatly benefit by
their incursions, irrespective of humanitarian concerns.84 Their selfinterested motives overshadowed the human rights violations that their
interventions helped ameliorate. Therefore states chose the nonintervention norm despite any moral issues regarding human suffering
at play.85 However, Tanzania’s action in Uganda demonstrated a
violation of the non-intervention norm, which many states actually
supported. The UN acquiesced in Tanzania’s two-year occupation of
Uganda; Tanzania was not seen as possessing “ulterior motives or
Instead,
strategic designs” comparable to Vietnam and India.86
Tanzania’s action was welcomed by the world community as ridding
Uganda of Idi Amin’s murderous reign.87 While Tanzania did not
formally claim humanitarian reasons for its invasion, instead relying on
self-defense against minor border incursions, its occupation of Uganda
was hugely disproportionate to this claim of self-defense, and the world

Id. at 218.
INT’L COMM’N, supra note 78, at n.59 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., 2110th mtg. at 3,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.2110 (Jan. 13, 1979)).
84
Franck, supra note 77, at 217–18.
85
Id. at 219.
86
Id. at 218.
87
Id. at 219.
82
83
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accordingly viewed it as one appropriately executed on humanitarian
grounds.88
B. Post-Cold War and 1990s Developments
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new period of unprecedented
Security Council activism, as well as a decrease in unilateral use of
armed force by the United States.89 Between 1990 and 1995, Chapter VII
collective measures in the form of binding Article 41 sanctions were
authorized by the Security Council in Iraq, Liberia, the former
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya, Angola, Haiti, and Rwanda.90 The Security
Council authorized the use of force five times during this period: in Iraq,
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Haiti.91 This activism was
accompanied by a growing realization among the international
community that the protection of human rights was no longer an
exclusive matter for each particular state.
This realization was
demonstrated by the Security Council’s expansion of its interpretation of
“international peace and security” in the 1990s.92 It authorized Chapter
VII peace enforcement military interventions on humanitarian grounds
in Bosnia in 1999 to protect civilians;93 Somalia in 1992 to protect aid
supplies and maintain law and order;94 and in Haiti in 1994 to restore
88
Id.; see also Buchanan, supra note 25, at 130 (stating that several such interventions had
moral justifications).
89
MALANCZUK, supra note 50, at 395.
90
Id. at 396.
91
Id.
92
Bellamy, supra note 3, at 34.
93
S.C. Res. 836, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (June 4, 1993).
94
S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992). In Resolution 794, the Security
Council addressed the continuing international concerns on the state of Somalia following
the coup against President Mohamed Siad Barre in 1992. Id. The Security Council met six
times in 1992 regarding the situation in Somalia; in its December 3, 1992 meeting, the
Security Council passed a resolution regarding Somalia containing the following
provisions:
Dismayed by the continuation of conditions that impede the delivery
of humanitarian supplies to destinations within Somalia, and in
particular reports of looting of relief supplies destined for starving
people, attacks on aircraft and ships bringing in humanitarian relief
supplies
. . . [and]
Determined further to restore peace, stability and law and order with a
view to facilitating the process of a political settlement under the
auspices of the [UN], aimed at national reconciliation . . . .
Id. at 2. The Security Council also
[s]trongly condemns all violations of international humanitarian law
occurring in Somalia, including in particular the deliberate impeding
of the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss3/6

VanLandingham: The Stars Aligned: The Legality, Legitimacy, and Legacy of 2011'

2012]

The Stars Aligned

881

democracy.95
The Security Council resolutions authorizing these
incursions demonstrated the evolving norm that the protection of human
rights was part and parcel of international peace and security, and it was
incumbent upon the Security Council to act per its Charter values.96 In
1991, the UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuallar stated that, “the
principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of
[s]tates cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human
rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity”—a
much different message than contained in the 1970 United Nations
Declaration on Friendly Relations.97 Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, in his
1992 Agenda for Peace address to the Security Council, stated:
The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty,
however, has passed; its theory was never matched by
reality. It is the task of leaders of [s]tates today to
understand this and to find a balance between the needs
of good internal governance and the requirements of an
ever more interdependent world.98
But was this expansion of the meaning of international peace and
security an ultra vires act by the Security Council? While “enforcement
measures” under Chapter VII can only be taken to address threats to or
breaches of international peace and security, or respond to acts of
aggression, the Charter never defines what such threats or breaches
include, nor does it define the concept of “international peace and
security.” This definitional lacuna left the door open for the Security
Council to include domestic human rights abuses as constituting such
threats and/or breaches. In fact, the drafters of the Charter indicated
that they wanted this phrase to be flexible.99 An expanding notion of
what constitutes a threat to international peace and security developed
despite such intervention’s tension with Article 2(7)’s protection of
of the civilian population, and affirms that those who commit or order
the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in
respect of such acts.
Id. at 3, ¶ 5.
95
S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).
96
Bellamy, supra note 3, at 34.
97
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, at
5, U.N. Doc. A/46/1 (Sept. 13, 1991); see also Byers & Chesterman, supra note 75, at 183
(describing the non-intervention stance in the 1970 U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations).
98
U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peace-Keeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17,
1992).
99
See Holzgrefe, supra note 1, at 40.
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internal, domestic matters as outside the scope of the UN, a tension
already lessened somewhat by the various human rights treaties and
earlier interventions as described above.100
In fact, according to theorists such as Alex Bellamy, it is now “widely
accepted that the Security Council has a legal right to authorize
humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of the Charter.”101
However, despite this claimed international acceptance of the legitimacy
of UN-sanctioned intervention on humanitarian grounds, the
appropriateness of humanitarian intervention both with such a UN
imprimatur and without remained the object of significant public debate
following several such uses of force in the 1990s.102 The tripartite
intervention into northern Iraq by Great Britain, the United States, and
France in 1991, in order to shelter the Kurds from Sadam Hussein’s
human rights abuses, was not explicitly authorized by the UN, yet never
condemned by it either.103 Several years later, NATO’s non-UNSCR
authorized humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia in the late 1990’s
sharply focused global attention in both the academic and international
political arenas on whether such non-UN-authorized action was legally
defensible.104
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. This section states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the [UN] to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII.
Id. Chapter VII enforcement measures include discretionary preliminary measures,
interruption of economic relations, interruption of mediums of communication, severance
of diplomatic relations, and military or non-military air, sea, or land operations “necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security.” U.N. Charter, art. 40–42.
101
Bellamy, supra note 3, at 33.
102
Franck, supra note 77, at 224–25.
103
See Heval Hylan, 1991 Humanitarian Intervention in Kurdistan and Iraq’s Sovereignty, 1,
56–57, available at http://kcdme.com/Humanitarian20Intervention1.pdf (last visited Oct. 5,
2011) (arguing that the intervention was legal).
104
Won Kidane, Managing Forced Displacement by Law in Africa: The Role of the New African
Union IDPS Convention, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 46−47 (2011) (discussing the Security
Council’s failure to intervene in the Kosovo genocide). This “prompted NATO to act
without . . . authorization . . . [which] was illegal on a technical level under the UN
Charter” but such necessity could be legitimized in the future by amending “the UN
Charter to facilitate collective intervention in circumstances of aggression or gross human
rights violations.” Id. Kidane continues by arguing that:
Kosovo demonstrates yet again a compelling need to address the
deficiencies in the law and practice of the UN Charter. The sometimescompelling need for humanitarian intervention (as at Kosovo), like the
compelling need for responding to interstate aggression (as against
Iraq over Kuwait), brings home again the need for responsible reaction
100
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However, it was the global community’s failure to stop the Rwandan
genocide in 1994, despite a new post-Cold War Security Council
unfettered by US-USSR rivalries, which sharpened the focus on when,
why, and how humanitarian intervention should occur. This was
followed by NATO’s illegal humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in
1999.105 While NATO’s action violated the Charter,106 it, and the
situation in Rwanda earlier, reflected larger issues:
the world
community’s failure to prevent and stop such mass human rights
violations in the first place, and the growing recognition that the
protection of human rights fell no longer within the domestic province of
states alone. World leaders, such as Great Britain’s Tony Blair, argued
that military intervention in third-world countries was necessary and
legitimate in order to safeguard human rights, even without Security
Council authorization.107 That is, there existed an “unacceptable gap
between what international law allows and what morality requires.”108

to gross violations of the Charter, or to massive violations of human
rights, by responsible forces acting in the common interest.
Id. at n.301.
105
See also Buchanan, supra note 25, at 130 (referring to the NATO action as illegal,
assumedly because not authorized by the Security Council).
106
Id. As did numerous other state actions taken on humanitarian grounds, such as
Tanzania’s overthrow of Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda in 1979. Id.
107
See Tony Blair, Prime Minister, U.K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ir., Address to the Chicago
Economic Club (Apr. 22, 1999), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/
content/article/154/26026.html [hereinafter Blair comments] (discussing criteria for
evaluating when a state could justify intervening in the internal affairs of another state on
humanitarian grounds). “The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify
the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts.”
Id.; see also Byers & Chesterman, supra note 75, at 199 (discussing the U.S. Secretary of
State’s emphasis on the exceptional nature of Kosovo and implying that UN authorization
was normally required whereas U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair “suggested that such
interventions might become more routine”); Stromseth, supra note 28, at 239 (highlighting
that “the United States declined to embrace a doctrine of humanitarian intervention”
following Kosovo, such as that outlined by Blair, that was unmoored from the UN Charter;
also discussing that the United States, when agreeing to participate in a NATO
intervention, emphasized previous UN resolutions which labeled the situation in Kosovo
as a threat to international peace and security). The U.S. approach to Kosovo was mirrored
in the justifications given by the U.S. government regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq: it
obsessively emphasized its actions as consistent with, and the implementation of, prior UN
resolutions. Id.; see John B. Bellinger III, Authority for Use of Force by the United States Against
Iraq Under International Law, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 10, 2003),
http://www.cfr.org/world/authority-use-force-united-states-against-iraq-underinternational-law/p5862 (discussing why previous UN Security Council authorizations
provided sufficient legal authority under the UN Charter to allow for use of force against
Iraq).
108
Buchanan, supra note 25, at 131.
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C. Somalia Effect: Rwanda
So if there was a growing recognition of the propriety of Security
Council intervention in domestic matters when human rights were at
issue, why did the Security Council fail to authorize armed intervention
in Rwanda, when over 800,000 people were slaughtered in 100 days?109
As pointed out by numerous scholars, it is telling that no state argued
that the Security Council lacked authority to intervene in Rwanda’s
internal domestic crises during the Security Council’s deliberations on
the matter.110 Instead, the UN’s then-recent failure in Somalia was cited
as the primary dissuading factor.111 Hence a closer look at Somalia is
warranted, since its perceived failure directly weakened the growing
support for intervention on humanitarian grounds.
In 1992, the Security Council determined that the internal violence in
Somalia, which was causing widespread starvation, was a threat to
Pursuant to Chapter VII, it
international peace and security.112
authorized an arms embargo and “all the necessary measures to ensure
the safety of personnel sent to provide humanitarian assistance . . . and
to ensure full respect for the rules and principles of international law
regarding the protection of civilian populations.”113 By the end of 1992,
it had authorized “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” under
its Chapter VII authorities.114
This initial Somalia UN operation, which concluded in spring of
1993, was largely deemed a success—but one soon undermined by the
more ambitious Security Council Resolution, which authorized nation-

109
See Chaim Kaufmann, See No Evil: Why America Doesn’t Stop Genocide, FOREIGN AFF.
(July/Aug. 2002), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58061/chaimkaufmann/see-no-evil-why-america-doesn-t-stop-genocide?page=2 (reviewing Samantha
Power’s book discussing the systemic political failures of the United States, which lead to
reticence regarding humanitarian interventions—claiming that Somalia caused lack of
intervention in Rwanda is overly simplistic–the Clinton Administration’s domestic political
calculus and conclusion their existed lack of public support was primary reason for U.S.
government inaction); see also Power, supra note 24, at 84 (giving statistics about the
number killed).
110
Bellamy, supra note 3, at 34.
111
Kaufmann, supra note 109; see also Chester A. Crocker, The Lessons of Somalia: Not
Everything Went Wrong, FOREIGN AFF. (May/June 1995), at 2, available at http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/readings/lessons.html (“Some see Somalia as
an almost welcome inoculation against the temptation to intervene in places such as
Rwanda . . . .”).
112
S.C. Res. 733, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (Jan. 23, 1992).
113
Id. ¶ 8.
114
S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
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building on a grand scale.115 The hand-off between U.S. forces, who had
been leading the creation of a secure environment for humanitarian relief
operations per the earlier resolution, and the UN did not go well and
created conditions ripe for the killing of eighteen U.S. servicemen in
October 1993.116 These combat deaths shook Americans, and led to the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from that mission and ultimately to the
mission’s overall collapse.117 While this failure was due more to strategic
confusion than to the inappropriateness of humanitarian interventions
themselves, it led the United States (and others) to seriously question
armed action on humanitarian grounds for years, and greatly
contributed to the lack of political will and consensus to become
involved in stopping the Rwandan genocide.118
D. Kosovo Debate
As mentioned above, the Rwandan tragedy and the desire to prevent
mass atrocities in Kosovo in the late 1990s led world leaders, such as
Great Britain’s former Prime Minister Tony Blair, to push the
humanitarian pendulum back toward the pre-Somalia period of
humanitarian activism. He declared in 1999 that there existed a right of
humanitarian intervention when necessary to prevent or stop gross
human rights abuses within a state, and that this moral right was
legitimate even without Security Council authorization.119 Then-Prime
Minister Blair, speaking in Chicago, articulated his theory that armed
force can be used by a state in three situations: in self-defense; per a
Security Council authorization; or in cases of “humanitarian
intervention.” He proposed five criteria for use when determining in
what context such military action outside of the UN was appropriate,
including whether all diplomatic options had been exhausted and
whether national interests were at stake.120
S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993).
Crocker, supra note 111, at 5.
117
Id. at 5.
118
See Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,
FOREIGN AFF. (Mar./Apr. 1996), at 82 (discussing the impact the UN mission in Somalia
had on future humanitarian crises such as Rwanda, and clarifying Somalia operations).
119
Abbott & Sloboda, supra note 30; see Blair comments, supra note 107 (“[T]he principle
of non-interference [in the actions of another sovereign state] must be qualified in
important respects . . . [because] oppression produces massive flows of refugees which
unsettle neighbouring countries, then [the underlying acts causing the flight of refugees]
can properly be described as ‘threats to international peace and security.’”).
120
Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention, 84
INT’L AFF. 615, 628 (2008). [hereinafter Bellamy, Problem of Military Intervention]; see Abbott
& Sloboda, supra note 30 (describing the ‘Blair doctrine’); see also Blair comments, supra note
107 (describing Blair’s considerations). Blair’s five criteria are as follows: (1) whether the
115
116
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When NATO unilaterally imposed a no-fly zone and militarily
intervened in Kosovo in 1999 on humanitarian grounds, without host
nation consent, it did so without approval of the UN Security Council
because of Chinese and Russian opposition.121 Many at the time, and
since, have argued that this action was legally ambiguous, or even
legally appropriate, because of the humans-rights atrocities perpetrated
by Yugoslav forces in Kosovo and condemned by the Security Council
itself in specific resolutions.122 Great Britain stated that the use of force
without Security Council authorization was legitimate “on the grounds
of overwhelming humanitarian necessity.”123 Germany likewise focused
on the looming humanitarian disaster and believed that the intervention
was in-step with the Security Council’s earlier resolutions.124 Belgium
went even further in arguing that NATO’s unilateral military
intervention in Kosovo was “lawful” because it was necessary to protect
a jus cogens, and was consistent with both earlier Security Council
resolutions and with Article 2(4).125
As mentioned in the introductory section of this Essay, many legal
theorists and policy makers have since understood the unilateral NATO
use of force on humanitarian grounds in Kosovo as having “established
the norm of resort to force without the authorisation [sic] of the UN
Security Council.”126 This “norm” theory rested partially on the Security
Council’s 1999 “retroactive endorsement” of NATO’s action via
Resolution 1244, which approved the terms of the cease-fire that resulted
from the NATO action plus authorized NATO troops in Kosovo based
intervenors are sure of the need to intervene (considering that “[w]ar is an imperfect
instrument for righting humanitarian distress, but armed force is sometimes the only
means of dealing with dictators”); (2) whether diplomatic options have been exhausted (as
the international community “should always give peace every chance”); (3) whether
military operations can be “sensibly and prudently” undertaken; (4) whether the
intervenors are prepared for a long-term commitment in the state they are intervening in;
and (5) do the intervenors have national interests involved in the intervention. Id.
121
Franck, supra note 77, at 224.
122
See S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998) (denouncing the human
rights violations committed by Yugoslav forces in Kosovo); S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998) (“Condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police
forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo . . . .”).
123
Stromseth, supra note 28, at 236 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124
Id. at 235.
125
Id. at 236; see Provisional Measures, supra note 31, ¶ II (outlining Belgium’s
arguments).
126
Abbott & Sloboda, supra note 30, at 5; see also Bellamy, supra note 3, at 34–35
(discussing the repercussions of unilateral NATO intervention in Kosovo). By using the
term “norm” this Author is not referring to peremptory norms per se. See generally Rafael
Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and International Humanitarian
Law (2001), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf (describing jus
cogens and norms.).
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on its Chapter VII authorities.127 Furthermore, a majority of twelve in the
Security Council defeated Russia’s resolution put forward during the
intervention in Kosovo, which “demanded an immediate end to the
intervention” and “condemned NATO’s ‘flagrant violation.’”128
E. Responsibility to Protect
No such norm of non-consensual use of force on humanitarian
grounds, outside the Security Council process, seemed to materialize
after Kosovo as predicted (and certainly none was implemented to
prevent the Darfur genocide), though the issue was debated for years.
The terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, as well as
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, diverted world attention, and the latter
especially underscored fears that military action on humanitarian
grounds, especially if without Security Council sanction, was simply
coercive intervention under cover of the protection of human rights.129
However, there was progress following Kosovo in establishing a better
lexicon to describe intervention on humanitarian grounds, as well as
semi-successful attempts at the UN to agree upon generalized criteria for
such interventions.
This lexical progression was in response to a challenge issued in 1999
by Koffi Annan, then UN Secretary-General, to reconcile the tensions
between the UN paradigm for authorizing force (specifically its
prohibition against unilateral action on humanitarian grounds if Security
Council approval wasn’t given per Chapter VII), and the prevention of
mass human rights violations within states:
The inability of the international community in the case
of Kosovo to reconcile these two equally compelling
interests—universal legitimacy and effectiveness in
defence [sic] of human rights—can be viewed only as a
tragedy. It has revealed the core challenge to the
Security Council and to the [UN] as a whole in the next
century: to forge unity behind the principle that massive

Franck, supra note 77, at 225; see S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244, ¶¶ 1–21 (June
10, 1999) (noting the necessary action that must take place in order to ensure the safety and
security of people in Kosovo).
128
Franck, supra note 77, at 224.
129
Bellamy, Problem of Military Intervention, supra note 120, at 625–26.
127
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and systematic violations of human rights—wherever
they may take place—should not be allowed to stand.130
The UN Secretary-General’s challenge supercharged an on-going
effort to outline definitive criteria as to when humanitarian intervention
is appropriate.
The Canadian government, via the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (“ICISS”) published
their response to this challenge in December 2001.131 The resultant
“responsibility to protect” principle, promulgated shortly after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, definitively embraced the UN Security
Council as the appropriate body to “authorize military intervention for
human protection purposes.”132 It focused on the state as the repository
of primary responsibility to prevent human suffering within its borders,
but if the state failed to shoulder this responsibility, this responsibility
shifted to the international community.133
The responsibility to protect doctrine’s “human protection purposes”
focused on a population suffering “serious and irreparable harm” (or
such harm was “imminently likely”), which involved “large scale loss of
life . . . [due to] deliberate state action, or state neglect of inability to act,
or a failed state situation; or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’ . . . whether
carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.”134 The
ICISS document emphasized a requirement to seek Security Council
authorization prior to any military intervention on humanitarian
grounds, but also provided options when Security Council authorization
is not forthcoming: The General Assembly should consider the matter
under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure and action by regional
organizations under Chapter VII of the Charter as long as they seek
subsequent Security Council authorization.135 The general principle of
responsibility by the state for protection against suffering within its
borders, and the principle that it is the international community’s
responsibility to act in cases in which the state fails to do so, were
accepted by the international community during the UN World Summit
in 2005, and unanimously reaffirmed a year later by the Security Council,

130
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, at
2, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4 (Sept. 20, 1999).
131
See generally ICISS, supra note 33 (establishing criteria for when humanitarian
intervention is appropriate).
132
Id. at XII.
133
Id. at XI.
134
Id. at XII.
135
See id. at 53 (outlining the procedure by which the General Assembly can take
measures where the Security Council has failed).
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though without any language referring to the propriety of use of force
without Security Council authorization.136
IV. CONCLUSION
Security Council Resolution 1973 has helped alter the post-Kosovo
perception “that the requirement of Security Council authorization is an
obstacle to the protection of basic human rights in internal conflicts.”137
It may not be emulated soon, due to the presence of critical, case-by-case
external dynamics (a hated dictator, strong support for intervention by
regional organizations, etc.), which supported such intervention in
Libya, but may be lacking in other situations. Regardless, its passage
proves that the Security Council can act successfully to authorize
military action within a sovereign member nation primarily to protect
civilian populations from crimes against humanity in this post-9/11 era,
thus implementing the responsibility to protect principles formally
embraced by the UN in 2005.
While the Libyan intervention has been criticized, notably by other
members of the Security Council, for overstepping the resolution’s
mandate of protecting civilians, it has not been seriously criticized for its
actual humanitarian intent, nor for stepping outside the bounds of the
Charter.138 While two veto-holding members of the Security Council,
China and Russia, did abstain, they were careful to underscore that the
humanitarian crisis was of “great concern” and both nations emphasized
their opposition to continuing violence against civilians in Libya.139 In
fact, shortly after passage of the resolution, Russian President
Medvedyev stated that he did “not consider the resolution in question
wrong”—it seems that commercial interests plus fear of instability in the
Caucasus region prompted the Russian abstention.140 Regarding China,
this one resolution alone should not be viewed as China jettisoning its

136
Bellamy, Problem of Intervention, supra note 120, at 615; see 2005 World Summit
Outcome, supra note 4, ¶¶ 138–39 (recognizing the responsibility of the states and
international community to “protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity”); S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674, ¶ 4 (Apr.
28, 2006) (reaffirming the responsibility outlined in the 2005 World Summit Outcome).
137
Buchanan, supra note 25, at 131.
138
See Henry Meyer, Russia to Resist Western-Led Regime Change After Syria Veto,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-1005/russia-to-resist-western-led-regime-change-after-syria-veto.html
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traditional non-intervention stance.141 But its opposition appeared based
on the “blank check,” open-ended nature of the resolution’s “‘all
necessary measures’” language, versus an abstention based on pure
sovereignty concerns or objections to the humanitarian intent of the
UNSCR.142
The criticism of the Libyan intervention mentioned above centered
primarily on mission-creep from protection of the civilian population to
regime change.143 While key NATO leaders were careful to call for the
Libyan leader to step down instead of claiming it was appropriate to use
force to do so,144 UN members such as Russia claimed that the
intervention went beyond its mandate “to use military force to change
the political system in the country and not just to protect civilians.”145
This markedly differs from criticism of the resolution’s humanitarian
objective and grounds, and highlights that UNSCR 1973 reinforced the
principle that it is the responsibility of the international community to
protect civilian populations from grave suffering, and that the Security
Council is the only legal and legitimate means to do so.
By strengthening the collective international responsibility norm
articulated in the responsibility to protect doctrine, as well as reinforcing
the concept that the maintenance of international peace and security can
include forcible interventions into a sovereign state, UNSCR 1973
pushed the humanitarian intervention pendulum back toward the
acceptability of such action. If such action continues to find greater
acceptance on the international stage because of an expansion of the
international legal framework for the legal and legitimate use of force,
and made easier to conduct via capabilities such as remotely-piloted
vehicles, greater focus needs to be paid to the jus in bello concerns
addressed elsewhere in this Essay.
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